About the authors
Written by Mathilde Chator · Solicitor at Slotine. Mathilde advises founders, PE sponsors and strategic buyers on earn-out structuring and post-completion price mechanisms.
Reviewed by Maeva Slotine · Founding Partner. Maeva oversees the firm’s cross-border M&A practice and the tax structuring of earn-out and deferred consideration mechanisms.
An earn-out defers part of the purchase price and makes it contingent on the target’s performance after closing. It bridges valuation gaps between buyer and seller, retains founders through a transition period, and shifts execution risk to the seller. In Hong Kong private M&A, earn-outs are used most often on founder-led exits and on PE deals where the buyer is unwilling to pay a full price on unproven future performance.
This guide sets out how earn-outs work in a Hong Kong SPA: the mechanics, the common structures (EBITDA, revenue, milestone), the difference between deferred consideration and earn-out, how locked-box and completion accounts fit alongside, the anti-manipulation covenants that protect the seller after closing, the disputes that arise, and how the Inland Revenue Ordinance (Cap. 112) can recharacterise earn-out payments as employment income taxable to salaries tax where they are linked to continued service. For the full SPA structure see the Share Purchase Agreement guide. For the wider deal framework see the M&A in Hong Kong guide and the Acquisitions practice. Warranties and indemnities are covered in the W&I guide.
Hong Kong private M&A
linked to continued employment
gains on share sales generally
Why earn-outs are used in Hong Kong M&A
An earn-out solves three commercial problems at once. First, it bridges valuation gaps between a buyer’s discounted view of the target and a seller’s optimistic view of future performance. Second, it retains founders through a transition period by giving them a financial reason to stay engaged. Third, it shifts execution risk to the seller, aligning the seller’s incentive with the buyer’s post-closing plan. On Hong Kong private M&A, earn-outs are most common on founder-led exits, high-growth tech or consumer targets, and PE exits where the buyer will not pay full price on unproven future performance.
The trade-off is complexity. Every earn-out introduces a measurement problem, an anti-manipulation problem, and a tax problem that the SPA must resolve before signing. The rest of this guide walks through those problems.
How an earn-out works: the mechanics
Any earn-out has five moving parts:
- Metric. EBITDA, revenue, gross profit, cash flow, or a specific milestone.
- Formula. A multiple of the metric, a delta above a baseline, or a binary trigger.
- Period. The window over which the metric is measured, commonly 1 to 3 years.
- Cap and floor. Maximum and minimum earn-out payment, typically expressed as a share of the total consideration.
- Payment mechanics. Annual instalments or a single payment at period end. Often paired with an escrow account funded at closing to secure the buyer’s payment obligation.
Each moving part is a negotiation. Under-specify any of them and the SPA drafts an ambiguity that will surface in a dispute at year end. The cost of precision at signing is orders of magnitude lower than the cost of litigation post-closing.
Structuring an earn-out on a Hong Kong deal? A 30-minute call is enough to align the metric, the duration, the payment mechanics and the anti-manipulation protections with the deal thesis.
Common earn-out structures on Hong Kong deals
Most common structure on Hong Kong M&A
Earn-out payment calibrated to target’s EBITDA over a defined earn-out period, often via a multiple. Requires precise EBITDA definition (add-backs, one-offs, accounting policy consistency) to avoid disputes.
Fast-growth targets, less mature businesses
Payment tied to top-line performance over the earn-out period. Simpler to measure but weaker alignment with underlying value creation. Common in tech and consumer targets pre-profitability.
Product, regulatory or contract milestones
Discrete milestone payments (regulatory approval, product launch, key client win, patent grant). Binary triggers avoid formula disputes but concentrate risk on specific events.
Structure selection is deal-specific. Mature profitable targets align with EBITDA-based earn-outs. Pre-profitability high-growth targets often use revenue. Regulatory or product-driven business cases suit milestone earn-outs. Slotine calibrates the structure to the target’s economics at the term sheet stage.
Deferred consideration vs earn-out: two different tools
Deferred consideration and earn-out are commonly confused, even in SPAs. They are different:
- Deferred consideration is a fixed amount of the purchase price payable at a later date, typically to fund a specific liability (a tax escrow release, a working capital true-up) or to defer cash flow. The amount is certain from the outset.
- Earn-out is a contingent amount that depends on the target’s post-closing performance. The amount is uncertain from the outset and can be zero.
Both can coexist in the same SPA. A common structure is a signing payment, plus a deferred payment 12 months later to release escrow, plus an earn-out over 2 to 3 years. Each has its own drafting and its own tax treatment.
Locked-box and completion accounts: the pricing framework
Locked-box and completion accounts are pricing mechanisms at closing. They sit alongside the earn-out, which is a post-closing performance mechanism. Understanding the difference matters because SPAs commonly combine one closing mechanism with an earn-out.
Reference date. Purchase price fixed by reference to a historical balance sheet (the locked-box date), usually the most recent audited or reviewed accounts.
Leakage. Seller warrants no value leakage between locked-box date and closing, save for permitted leakage.
Interest ticker. Buyer pays interest on the price for the period from locked-box date to closing.
Use. Price certainty at signing. Common on PE exits with clean audited accounts.
Reference date. Purchase price adjusted post-closing by reference to accounts prepared at completion, on agreed accounting policies.
Adjustments. Typically for net working capital, cash, debt and specific items.
Dispute mechanism. Independent accountant referral if the parties cannot agree the completion accounts.
Use. Post-closing accuracy. Common on private founder deals and where the accounts are not fully audited.
On Hong Kong deals, locked-box has become the market standard on PE-backed exits with clean audited accounts. Completion accounts remain common on founder-led deals and on cross-border transactions where the target’s accounting standards diverge from the acquirer’s.
Anti-manipulation covenants: the seller’s protections
Once the buyer takes control, the target’s future performance sits in the buyer’s hands. Without express constraints, the buyer can depress the earn-out metric through decisions that make short-term commercial sense but reduce the seller’s payment. Anti-manipulation covenants are the seller’s protection.
Run the business in the ordinary course
Buyer must operate the target consistent with pre-completion practice, or expressly in a way that promotes achievement of the earn-out.
No allocation of group costs
Buyer cannot allocate group overheads, transfer pricing charges, or intercompany fees that would depress the earn-out metric.
Consistent accounting
Accounting policies for the earn-out period fixed by reference to pre-completion practice. No changes that would distort measurement.
Seller access + independent accountant
Seller access to the target books during the earn-out period and referral to an independent accountant if calculation is disputed.
The buyer will push back on the strictest anti-manipulation drafting, arguing it constrains post-closing integration and value creation. The compromise is usually a covenant to act in good faith and not to take steps intended to reduce the earn-out, combined with specific accounting protections. Careful drafting is where earn-out packages are won or lost.
Salaries tax recharacterisation risk under Cap. 112 s. 9 is the single most common blind spot on founder earn-outs. Slotine models the tax exposure at structuring stage and drafts around it.
Tax treatment: capital sale proceeds or salaries tax?
The single most important tax question on a Hong Kong earn-out is characterisation. Is the earn-out payment additional consideration for the shares (capital), or is it payment for the seller’s post-closing services (employment income)?
Position. Where an earn-out is genuinely additional consideration for the shares, it is capital in nature.
Tax. Hong Kong does not tax capital gains generally. No profits tax on the sale of shares held on capital account.
Requirement. The earn-out must be structured as sale consideration for the shares, not as payment for future services of the seller.
Position. Where the earn-out is conditional on the seller remaining in employment or providing services post-closing, IRD may recharacterise it as employment income.
Anchor. Section 9(1)(a) of Cap. 112 catches wages, salary, fee, commission, bonus, gratuity, perquisite or allowance “whether derived from the employer or others”. Very wide net.
Consequence. Salaries tax at rates up to 15% standard or 17% progressive. Employer reporting under IR56 filings.
The distinction matters because Hong Kong does not tax capital gains generally, but salaries tax applies to employment income at rates up to 15% standard or 17% progressive. A poorly structured earn-out can convert a tax-free capital receipt into a fully taxable salary payment.
How Cap. 112 s. 9(1)(a) catches earn-outs
Section 9(1)(a) of the Inland Revenue Ordinance defines “income from any office or employment” to include “any wages, salary, leave pay, fee, commission, bonus, gratuity, perquisite, or allowance, whether derived from the employer or others”. The “whether derived from the employer or others” wording is broad enough to catch payments that are formally structured as sale consideration but that IRD considers economically to be reward for services.
The IRD looks at the substance of the arrangement, not just the labels. A common danger sign is an earn-out that is forfeited or reduced if the seller leaves employment during the earn-out period. Another is an earn-out clearly disproportionate to the target’s expected performance if measured on an arm’s length sale basis. Structuring the earn-out as a genuine performance-based sale consideration, decoupled from the seller’s ongoing employment, is the core mitigant.
Common earn-out disputes and points of failure
Post-closing earn-out disputes cluster around a few recurring issues:
- Metric definition disputes. Was EBITDA defined? What add-backs are permitted? How are one-off items treated?
- Accounting policy disputes. Did the buyer change accounting policies during the earn-out period? Are new policies consistent with pre-completion practice?
- Cost allocation disputes. Did the buyer allocate group overheads or intercompany charges that depressed the metric?
- Ordinary course disputes. Did the buyer restructure the target in ways that reduced the earn-out?
- Change of control disputes. Was there a resale, restructuring or IPO during the earn-out period that triggered acceleration?
Hong Kong appellate authority specifically on earn-out disputes is limited. Practitioners typically frame arguments by reference to widely cited English common law authorities on implied obligations to promote earn-out achievement, and to the express terms of the SPA. The best defence against disputes is precise drafting at signing.
Five common earn-out mistakes in Hong Kong M&A
“EBITDA” without a schedule of add-backs, permitted adjustments and accounting policies is where post-closing disputes live. Define the metric line by line.
Buyers can depress the earn-out metric via cost allocation, capex deferrals or accounting policy changes. Seller must lock ordinary course, no cost shifting, and consistent policies expressly.
Conditioning the earn-out on continued employment brings it within Cap. 112 s. 9(1)(a). Structure the earn-out as sale consideration for the shares, decoupled from the seller’s ongoing service.
Without an independent accountant referral clause, an earn-out dispute escalates to full litigation or arbitration on complex accounting issues. Design the ladder upfront.
Deferred consideration is a fixed amount payable at a later date. Earn-out is contingent on performance. Mixing them in the drafting produces enforcement uncertainty.
Slotine advises founders, PE sponsors and strategic buyers on earn-out structuring, anti-manipulation drafting, tax positioning, and post-completion disputes. Free scoping call, fee proposal within a few working days.
How Slotine advises on earn-outs
Slotine advises founders, PE sponsors, and strategic buyers across the earn-out lifecycle on Hong Kong and cross-border M&A:
- Term sheet stage: select the metric, calibrate the formula and period, align on cap and floor.
- SPA drafting: draft the earn-out schedule with a line-by-line metric definition, the anti-manipulation covenants, the acceleration triggers, and the dispute resolution ladder.
- Tax positioning: structure the earn-out to preserve capital treatment and avoid Cap. 112 s. 9(1)(a) recharacterisation as employment income. Coordinate with the tax practice on employer reporting obligations if applicable.
- Escrow structuring: where the earn-out is escrow-backed, draft the escrow terms and release triggers.
- Post-completion: advise on measurement, exercise audit rights, and manage disputes through negotiation, independent accountant referral or arbitration.
- Cross-border: coordinate with international counsel via Legalmondo and Ursusnetwork where the seller or buyer is domiciled in France, Belgium, Switzerland, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom, the United States, or Portuguese-speaking jurisdictions.


